We consider the setting of secure publishing of XML documents, in which read-only access control policies (ACPs) over static XML datasets are enforced using cryptographic keys. The role-based access control (RBAC) model provides a flexible method for specifying such policies. Extending the RBAC model to include role parameterization addresses the problem of role proliferation which can occur in large scale systems. In this paper, we describe the complete design of a parameterized RBAC (PRBAC) model for XML documents. We also describe algorithms for generating the minimum number of keys required to enforce an arbitrary PRBAC policy; for distributing to each user only keys needed for decrypting accessible nodes; and for applying the minimal number of encryption operations to an XML document required to satisfy the protection requirements of the policy. The time complexity of our approach is linear w.r.t. document size and the number of roles.
INTRODUCTION
There is growing interest in providing controlled and secure access to XML documents [ (Bertino et al, 2002) , (Bertino et al., 2004) , (Damiani et al, 2002) , (Devanbu et al, 2001) ]. In this context, controlled access allows the owner of data to specify permission policies indicating which users can access specific documents, or parts thereof. Secure access to data means that data is confidential, i.e., visible only to authorized parties. Since XML data has become a de facto standard for many applications, in particular for Web applications, much of the research done on controlled access in recent years deals with data in this format. In addition to proposed standards for encrypting portions of an XML document, such as the W3C XML Encryption Syntax and Processing recommendation (W3C XML Encryption, 2001), secure publishing approaches have been proposed in the research community that illustrate how multiple users holding varying permissions over an XML document can gain controlled access to the same version of that document, through the selective application of cryptographic keys [ (Bertino et al, 2002) , (Mikalu et al, 2003) , (Müldner et al, 2006) ]. Using this technique, a single version of an XML document is published (e.g., posted to an HTTP server). Each user is provided with a set of keys via a secure channel; by applying her available decryption keys, a user gains access only to the portions of the document authorized by the designated ACP. For example, the contents of a statistical or scientific database may be periodically sanitized (to remove sensitive information), exported as XML, and published. In such a setting, it is important to note that each published document is static, and hence access control policies only allocate read permissions. The role-based access control (RBAC) model provides a powerful and flexible method for specifying such policies. However, the RBAC model is susceptible to role proliferation. For example, thousands of scientists may be granted access to various parts of an XML dataset; the access permissions accorded to each scientist may vary according to their specialization and their affiliation. In the worst case, it is possible that a role-based policy must assign a unique role to each scientist. The concept of role parameterization has been shown to be an effective solution to role proliferation (Ge et al, 2004) ; instead of defining a separate role for each scientist, one can use a much smaller number of roles and parameterize each role with variables representing area of specialization and affiliation. With a smaller number of roles, it becomes easier to formulate and enforce the desired access control restrictions.
In this paper, we introduce techniques that can be used to implement controlled and secure access to published XML documents. Specifically, we define parameterized role-based ACPs (PRBAC policies); each such policy consists of a set of rules associating a role with one or more views (or fragments) defined over an XML document. Policy rules may contain role parameters and/or system variables. Once a user is authenticated to play role R, any role parameters and system variables are instantiated and the user can access only those views which are associated with role R. We have designed a key assignment algorithm which, given a PRBAC policy and an XML document (or dataset), generates the minimal number of keys required to enforce the stated policy. Generated keys are used to multi-encrypt a document so that each element of the document is encrypted with at most one key. Since each view may be encrypted with multiple keys, users playing a specific role R are provided with an R-accessible keyring, consisting of the set of keys needed to decrypt and access exactly the document portions they are allowed to see. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 3 introduces preliminary notation and concepts and Section 4 defines the language of parameterized roles and the PRBAC model. Section 5 describes key generation and multi-encryption of documents. Section 6 describes areas for future work. Because of space restrictions, proofs are omitted. Contributions Our contributions include the complete description of a PRBAC model tailored for static, published XML datasets. To our knowledge, this is the first formulation of such a model. We also detail an approach that, for a given uninstantiated PRBAC policy (i.e. even before values of parameters and system variables are known) and XML document D
(1) generates the minimum number of keys needed to multi-encrypt D; (2) applies the minimal number of encryption operations on D needed to enforce the PRBAC policy; and (3) for each role R in the PRBAC, generates the R-accessible keyring. All of these steps can be carried out using two SAX-based traversals of D.
RELATED WORK
Motivated by the increasing use of XML as a data representation format, several access control models specifically tailored for XML have been proposed in recent years. Such approaches permit the formulation of fine-grained access control policies at the schema, document, and/or element level. At a high level, it is possible to distinguish between materialized vieworiented approaches, in which client queries are answered over a sub-document (view) generated by the database management system, containing only the accessible regions of an XML database.[ (Bertino et al, 2002) , (Damiani et al, 2002) ], and secure publishing approaches (Miklau et al 2003) and (Müldner et al, 2006) , in which a single, partially-encrypted version of a document is distributed and access control policies are enforced using public-key cryptography. While materialized view-oriented approaches hide the original document from the client, a very large number of materialized views may be required in applications dealing with large, complex documents and/or several users. Secure publishing approaches are designed for cases in which it is unnecessary, and even undesirable, to allow users direct access to a database, and instead provide to users a published, static "snapshot" of the database contents. Our approach follows the secure publishing paradigm.
Role based ACPs have been extensively researched [ (Ferraiolo et al, 2001) , (Osborn et al, 2000) , (RBAC, 2008) , (Wang et al, 2004) ]. (Ge, 2004) describes an extension to the role-based access control model in which parameterized roles are used to deal with scenarios in which data access is dependent on certain characteristics held by an individual user. In applications with a small number of users, it is feasible to define a separate role for each individual user, yet this approach clearly becomes unmanageable if the user base is moderately large. Rather than defining several thousand roles with a membership of one, an administrator can define a single, parameterized role, and specify an access control rule which dictates access to specific data. Our approach applies the notion of parameterized roles to ACPs for XML documents, allowing them to be used for expressing access control policies.
PRELIMINARIES

Introduction to Roles
In most systems, access rights are defined using access control policies (ACPs) which state which subjects have specific rights. In the role-based access control model (RBAC), users are identified through roles, and access rights are associated with each role. When a user is assigned to a role, they acquire the role's permissions.
In general, XML access control policy rules are five-tuples (subject, resource, action, permission, propagation), with actions such as read, write, or modify; permissions such as add or remove; and a propagation policy that allows one to limit the rule to a local scope or apply it to a more global scope (Fundulaki et al, 2004) . In this paper, we consider only read access (since we focus on secure publishing scenarios, writes are not applicable), and we do not consider various permissions. We fix a no propagation policy: specifying an element e in an access control rule applies the rule only to e, and not to other elements within the sub-tree rooted at e. Therefore, role-based access control rules for XML documents in this paper will consist of pairs of the form (role, resource), where a resource is a document fragment specified using an XPath expression (XPath, 2008) .
Documents and Views
The focus of our work is to define ACPs for fragments of XML documents, which we call views. In our approach, we publish a single multi-encrypted XML document (or dataset).
We assume that at the system level, there are pre-defined system variables (such as user ID), and we use identifiers starting with $ to denote these variables (e.g., $ID). System variables are typed using XML Schema types (XML Schema, 2008) (e.g., $ID: xs:integer), and they must remain static during the course of a user session (i.e., we do not consider dynamic system variables representing values such as the current time or the number of users currently in the system). In other words, there is a fixed set of static variables, and for each user values of all these variables are initialized and do not change during the session, i.e., until this user logs off. Views are specified using a subset of XPath expressions referred to as document paths. Document paths may have conditions, and in XPaths these conditions use element names and attributes. Here, we extend XPaths and allow free variables to appear in conditions. There are two kinds of free variables: those that represent system variables and whose names start with $, and those that represent formal parameters and whose names start with % (for more on formal parameters of roles, see Section 4.1). We assume that a single comparison in the path can use at most one free variable; e.g. we don't allow conditions of the form [$Id = %Id]. Definition 3.1 A local document path is a document path with no free variables. A global document path is a document path which is not local. A global document path is called instantiated when each occurrence of free variables is replaced by some value.
For a document D, by P D, loc we denote the set of local paths in D. Each local document path defines a fragment of the document D, which we call a view of D (and we frequently refer to the path P as the view P). Similarly, by P D, glob we denote the set of global paths in D, and the set of all document paths is denoted by P D = P D, loc ∪ P D, glob . A local path and an instantiated global path each define a fragment of the document D.
Multi-encryption
In this section, by a key we refer to a symmetric cryptographic key (e.g., an AES key). A keyring is a set of keys. An ACP may define multiple views for a single document. By the multi-encrypted document mdocument, we denote a document with an associated keyring , in which various views may be encrypted with different sets of keys from . However, no node in the m-document is super-encrypted, i.e., encrypted more than once. Based on permissions defined in the ACP, users will be provided a subset of enabling them to decrypt exactly those views they are entitled to see.
ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we first describe roles and then use roles to define the document-level PRBAC.
Language of Roles
In our access control model, roles can be parameterized or parameter-less. Parameterized roles contain typed parameters. They are useful because they help to avoid hard-coding multiple roles which provide permissions depending on external values known when the role is being assigned; for example:
• There are many departments with different names.
• There is a "security level" attribute and permissions depend on the given security level. A parameterized role is called instantiated if all its formal parameters are replaced by actual values.
Let N be the set of role names, P the set of parameter names, and T the set of parameter type names (we assume that these three sets are mutually disjoint). We define the alphabet A as the union N ∪ P ∪ T ∪ {(, ), ;}. We write role names in upper case (e.g., STUDENT). Parameter names start with %. Definition 4.1 A role grammar over the alphabet A is defined as follows:
role := roleName | parameterizedRole parameterizedRole := roleName '(' rolePars ')' rolePars := formalPar | formalPar ';' rolePars formalPar := parName':' parTypeName where roleName∈ ∈ ∈ ∈N, parName∈ ∈ ∈ ∈P, and parTypeName∈ ∈ ∈ ∈T.
¡ Example 4.1
An example of a parameterized role is: USER(%id : xs:integer; %name : xs:string).
¢
Simple Roles
In Section 4.1 we defined the role grammar users) or to make them inaccessible to all users (i.e., to encrypt them, but not to provide the keys used for encryption of these nodes to any user). For the former case, the symbol is used, while for the latter case we use the symbol . Therefore, the actual definition of the document-level ACP is that it is pair ( D , ), where is either or . For simplicity (unless specified otherwise), in the sequel, we omit the second element of this pair, and assume that by default it is always 
Creating Local Paths from Global Paths
In this section, we describe keyring generation at the document level, corresponding to a document-level policy D :
% & P D . If all paths from the set P D are local then keyring generation can take advantage of the fact that data in the document D can be used to evaluate all conditions in these paths, and therefore each path uniquely identifies a fragment of D. The situation is more complicated if the policy has some global paths; for example, it has a parameter-less role and an associated path with conditions using system variables, or it has a parameterized role and an associated path with conditions using formal parameters of this role. In such cases, conditions in paths can not be evaluated until values of corresponding free variables are known. However, postponing keyring generation until such time would mean that, for a parameterized role, a keyring would be generated for each user that can play this role (using specific actual parameters), possibly resulting in unnecessary duplication of keys. Therefore, we employ a different technique and deal with global paths in a special way.
Recall that a global path P contains free variables representing role parameters and/or system variables. We require an algorithm that finds all values in P which are being compared with free variables, and replaces P with local paths in which these variables are replaced with values relevant for evaluating conditions. In the current version, there is a restriction on the type T of any free variable that may appear in a global path; specifically, we assume that T has a linear ordering < and , here called a linear order that satisfies the following condition: for any three elements x, y and z of type T; if x<y, then exactly one of the following three inequalities holds: z<x,x¡z<y, or y¢z. For example, integer or real free variables may be used. We define intervals of the form(v 1 , v 2 ) = {v: The auxiliary Algorithm 5.1 given below considers a role R and a global path P, and splits P into one or more local paths. More specifically, it builds a set of intervals that partitions the set of values of type T, based on values from the document D used in comparisons with free variables in P, and a set of local paths corresponding to all instantiations of P using values of the set of intervals. Algorithm 5.1 Input: A document D, a simple role R (different from § ), and a global document path P with n free variables A 1 ,A 2 ,...,A n of respective types T 1 ,T 2 ,...,T n ; each type T i has a linear order. Note that some free variables may represent parameters of a parameterized role R and others may represent system variables; in particular R may be parameter-less and all free variables in P may be system variables, or vice-versa. Output: A vector Locals[R] consisting of pairs of the form (local path, keyring), and a table Intervals(D, R, P) containing pairs (k-tuples of intervals, index into Locals). The complexity of this algorithm is linear in terms of the size of D.
Generating Keyrings and Encrypting
Consider an XML document D and its document-level access control policy D :
¨ © We now consider various ways keys may be assigned to documents. Since views may be overlapping, we can not assign keys per view. Indeed, if we did so, then for two overlapping views V 1 and V 2 we would have two corresponding keys 1 and 2 , and the intersection of the two views would have to be super-encrypted using both 1 and 2 (assigning keys per view would mean that the user who has access to the view V i would be given a key i and so other options such as encrypting V 1 with one key and V 2 -V 1 with the other key would have given access to the part that is not allowed). What we need to do is to partition the set D (and at the same time each view) into disjoint sets, and then assign one key for each set in this partition.
Below, we will assume that all views in D () are different. If this is not the case, then we proceed as follows. 
Decrypting m-documents
Assume that a user U in role R has obtained the keyring D, D (R) of R-accessible keys and wants to decrypt an m-document M D . U will traverse M D , and use names of keys from D, D (R) to extract the appropriate key to decrypt R-accessible nodes.
Obtaining Keyrings
U may request a keyring that she will use to decrypt a fragment of the m-document D. From the list of roles U is currently playing, she selects a certain role R, and then proves that she plays R by presenting the certificate obtained when U was granted R. Being in role R, U will specifically request the keyring of R-accessible keys for the document D. Let P = D (R). If R is a simple role and the path P = D (R) is a local path, then is retrieved from the appropriate keyring Local[]. If D (R) is a global path, then the set Intervals(D, R, P) is consulted. The set of values of actual parameters (if any) of R and the values of system variables are used to determine the specific cube that contains all these values. If there is no such cube, U has no permissions granted; otherwise, the keyring at the index associated with this cube is returned.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described a parameterized rolebased access control (PRBAC) model allowing permissions to be specified over fragments of published XML datasets. Our future work will focus on implementing the PRBAC model, and designing and implementing algorithms allowing existing keyrings to be incrementally altered in response to update operations performed on the document and/or access control policy.
